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Abstract
We develop a model of endogenous entrepreneurship and marriage. Spouses
influence entrepreneurship via three channels: they reduce benefits by work-
ing less the more profitable the business is, they reduce costs by working more
in case of business failure, and children, associated with a spouse, increase the
cost of failure. We use administrative matched owner-employer-employee-
spouse data to estimate the specifications derived from our model. The model
is informative on the sources of endogeneity and the IV strategy. We show that
higher marriage rates induce less entry but larger firms on average. Through
the lens of our model, marriage increases firm productivity.
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1 Introduction
How does having a spouse affect the decision to start a firm? How does it affect the
type of firms created by individuals? The answer to this question is crucial if we
wish to understand how changes in household composition affect firm creation and
productivity.
We know there have been secular changes to household composition. This is
best portrayed by the decline in marriage rates, from 62% in 1990 to 55% in 2013 in
the US and from 59.71% in 1984 to 45.58% in 2013 for Canada, and the rise of one
person households, from 9% to 12% in the US and from 20.3% in 1981 to 27.6% in
2011 in Canada.1 To evaluate how these changes in household composition affected
productivity in the economy, we need to understand the interplay between firm
formation, composition of new firms and marriage.2 Yet, despite the large literature
on entrepreneurship and firm formation (Lucas Jr (1978), Hurst and Lusardi (2004),
Cagetti et al. (2006), Quadrini (2000), Beaudry et al. (2018) and Haltiwanger et al.
(2013)), there has been no research on how marriage can affect both entry into
entrepreneurship and firm size.
To study the role of spouses on the entrepreneurship of the main earner we
propose a tractable model of endogenous entrepreneurship, endogenous marriage,
endogenous spousal labour supply, heterogeneity in innate entrepreneurial ability
and business project specific productivity. In the model, main earners choose ex-
ante whether to marry based on a taste for marriage, their innate entrepreneurial
ability and the overall productivity of the economy. Households can either be two
persons or single person households.3
Main earners in the household draw business opportunities from an exogenous
distribution. In equilibrium, for all business opportunities with productivity above
their optimal threshold, the household decides the main earner should start a firm.
1These numbers for the US are based on CPS data. Note that individuals who stated they had a
common-law marriage were coded as "married".
2Of course this presumes that firm formation is important for productivity and aggregate activity.
Haltiwanger (2011) and Clementi and Palazzo (2016) study the contribution of firm creation to
productivity.
3To our knowledge we are the first to consider a model with endogenous marriage, endogenous
entrepreneurship and endogenous spousal labor supply.
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In two person households, main earner and spouse share their income, such that the
consumption of each individual depends on both their income and of their partner.
The household chooses whether spouses work or not (associated to a fixed cost) and
if so how many hours they work.
This tractable framework delivers three channels via which being a couple in-
fluences the decision to start a firm. First, any increase in profits is partly offset
by spouses working less hours or by the need for it to be shared with non-working
spouses (spousal sharing effect). This channel makes entrepreneurship less attrac-
tive to married households which in turn become more selective on which business
projects to implement.
Secondly, if the business fails, the spouse works more hours (spousal insurance
effect). This channel is a natural application of the added worker effect, vastly
studied in labor economics (See Hyslop (2001), Stephens (2002), Gallipoli and
Turner (2009), Blundell et al. (2016), Wu and Krueger (2018)), to business risk.
This insurance channel decreases the cost of failure for married households. This
pushes a married household to become less selective in which business projects to
implement.
Finally, being in a couple is often associated to having children (offspring ef-
fect). Children have three ways of affecting the decision to start a firm. First of
all, children increase the cost of business failure. Secondly, children decrease the
benefits to a more profitable business since some of these higher profits are shared
with the children. These first two channels make children an additional incentive
for married households to be more selective on which business projects to imple-
ment. Third, when both spouses are working, children decrease total consumption
of the couple for a given total household income. Since consumption when both are
working represents the opportunity cost to entrepreneurship, all else equal, children
decrease the opportunity cost to entrepreneurship.4 Hence, there is ambiguity in
whether children induce lower or higher entry rate and average size.
Although the theoretical response of entry rates into entrepreneurship to mar-
riage is ambiguous, the model delivers a sharp prediction that marriage rates affect
4See Galindo da Fonseca (2019) for a recent paper on the importance of opportunity costs for
entrepreneurship.
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average size of firms in the opposite direction it affects entry rates. This empirical
implication comes from our mechanism of selection upon entry into entrepreneur-
ship driving the differences between married and unmarried individuals of same
ability. Instead of imposing it in our empirical estimation, we verify it holds in
data.
Next, we proceed to an empirical analysis with the goal of investigating the
relative strenghts of these channels and testing the model’s empirical prediction. We
make use of full universe confidential tax data with links between firms, employees
and firm owners. The dataset is further merged to immigration landing files since
1980. Finally, the additional linkage between individuals and their spouses allows
us to perform robustness tests otherwise impossible in other datasets. In particular,
we verify our results are not being driven by firms jointly owned by spouses or those
for which the spouse is employed by their partner.
We use the model to derive our instrument, the conditions under which it pro-
vides consistent estimates of the coefficients of interest and to derive implied re-
strictions in the data. This strategy fits with a literature that puts together structural
modelling and instrumental variable estimation (Blundell et al. (1998), Beaudry et
al. (2012), Beaudry et al. (2018), Tschopp (2015) and Green et al. (2017))). We
focus on estimating first order implications of the theory as implied by its linear
approximation. We use city-country of birth level variation to test the model. Our
instrument for the marriage rate is the gender ratio (number of women divided by
men) for a particular city-country of birth pair. The intuition is that men belonging
to groups with higher number of women relative to men are more likely to find a
potential partner (Angrist (2002)).
Through the lens of the model, we allow for the gender ratio to directly affect
entrepreneurship. Given our objective of using the gender ratio as an instrument,
this corresponds to a violation of the exclusion restriction. Then, using the structure
of the model, we derive the correct specification to address this possible concern.
In particular, the gender ratio affects intra household income sharing.5 This in turn
induces changes in female labor force participation and entrepreneurship of the mar-
5This is consistent with empirical work on sex ratios and intrahousehold resource allocation
(Chiappori et al. (2002) and Angrist (2002)).
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ried household. Hence, from the model, we derive a strict relationship between the
intra household income sharing parameter and female labor force participation. We
show that controlling for female labor force participation we control for variation
in intra household income sharing. This shuts down the direct effect of the gender
ratio on entrepreneurship. In absence of this direct effect, the exclusion restriction
holds and we can use the gender ratio as an instrument for marriage rates.
We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the marriage rate is associated to
a 0.2 percentage point decrease in the entry rate and a 1.13% increase in average
size of firms. These findings are consistent with our prediction that the effect of
marriage on average size has an opposite sign to the effect on entry. We interpret
this as a general test of selection mechanisms commonly used in the firm dynamics
literature. Although widely used, little empirical work has been done to test this
underlying restriction present in selection-based models. Our results are consistent
with the spousal sharing effect or the larger cost of failure associated to children
dominating over the spousal insurance effect.
To distance our instrument from any endogenous migration choice in the part
of immigrants, we verify our results are robust to using only immigrants having
arrived at age 15 or younger. One concern is that our results are being driven by
borrowing constraints, more easily overcome by two person households. To adress
this issue, we verify our results are robust in both magnitude and significance to
excluding high capital industries. We also verify our results hold for both men and
women.
Finally, we use our estimates to perform a bounding exercise for the effect of
changes in the marriage rate on firm productivity. Our results imply a decrease in
marriage rates is associated to a fall in average firm productivity.
2 Model
In this section I go over the main model of the paper. The main objective is to derive
the intuition for the different forces that come into play when an individual decides
to start a firm as a function of having a spouse or not. The model also delivers the
main empirical specifications to be estimated in the data. We start by describing
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individual choices conditional on marriage and individual entrepreneurial ability ✓.
After having done that, we describe the endogenous decision to marry as a function
of entrepreneurial ability ✓ and an individual taste for marriage.
In the model we abstract from the possibility of the spouse helping out in the
business started by their partner. This assumption is consistent with our results in
the empirical section. In particular, in our data we find that the majority of new
entries are started exclusively by only one member of the household and do not list
the spouse as an employee. We also verify our main empirical results are not being
driven by the presence of this subgroup of firms in which the spouse is participating
in the business. We also abstract from the benefit of entrepreneurs receiving em-
ployer provided health insurance via their spouse. This choice is consistent with our
data where such considerations are likely of second order due to Canada’s public
health care system. In this sense, the usage of Canadian data allows us to control
for a channel that otherwise would be present in the case of the US. Finally, we do
not have borrowing constraints in the model. This is motivated by our finding in
the empirical section that the results are unchanged once we restrict our attention to
low capital requirement industries.6
In the economy there are two types of households. Single individual households
are composed of only one individual who is also the main earner. The second type
of household is that of couples. These are composed of one main earner and one
spouse. There is no savings and each household consumes their current income.
We consider CRRA utility with coefficient of risk aversion  . There are no search
frictions. All individuals searching for a job, find one instantaneously. The flow
utility derived from income I for the single person household is given by
U s(I) ⌘ I
1  
1    . (1)
For households composed of two individuals, there are two sources of income, one
is the income of the main earner, I , and the other is the income of the spouse, wh.
The income of the spouse is a function of how many hours the household chooses
6This is not to say that borrowing constraints are not important for the decision to start a firm.
Rather, it says that the differences in entrepreneurship caused by marriage do not seem to be driven
by borrowing constraint considerations.
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for the spouse to work, h, and the wage paid to do so, w.
Being in a couple is often associated to having children. We model children by a
share   of the married household income that is neither consumed by the spouse or
the main earner. The choice of modelling children this way is to keep the model
tractable while already allowing us to talk about the higher cost of business failure
for couples with children.7 Of the remaining 1    , let   be the share of income
that is left for the spouse to consume. Let each individual belong to a group g. Each
group g defines the relevant marriage pool for an individual. Next, to allow for
some reduced form intra household reallocation let   be a function of the gender
ratio in the individual’s group g, #g. This is consistent with recent empirical liter-
ature showing how changes in household behaviour are consistent with the gender
ratio affecting intra household income sharing (Chiappori et al. (2002) and Angrist
(2002)).8 Individuals take # as given. The household has a cost  h associated to a
spouse working h hours. This disutility is paid by the entire household. Then, the
flow utility of a married household composed of a main earner that makes I income
and a spouse that earns wh income is given by
µ
[(1   ) (#g)(I + wh)]1  
1    +(1 µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))(I + wh)]1  
1      h (2)
where µ is the exogenous weight placed on the utility of the spouse and  (#g) is
such that 0   (#g)  1, 8#g. Note that µ is a preference parameter while   is
how the income is shared within the household. The married household solves the
static problem of how many hours should the spouse work. As a result, conditional




[(1   ) (#g)(I + wh)]1  
1    +(1 µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))(I + wh)]1  
1      h
(3)
7We thank Tiago Cavalcanti for suggesting this modelling strategy.
8Note that the objective here is not to micro found changes in intra household income sharing or
to study this channel. Rather, the goal is to allow for the possibility that the gender ratio affects intra















when h is an interior solution and 0 or 1 when we get corner solutions. Once we
replace this expression in the flow utility of the couple, we obtain as total flow utility
for the household with the spouse working, Ums (I) :

























Now, consider as well that the household makes the decision on whether the spouse
should work or not. Each spouse has a fixed cost of working  ⇠ M(). This
decision is done ex-ante by the household and is irreversible.  is paid only once
upon the decision. This choice is done by the household with knowledge of their
type g but not knowing which income the main earner is going to have. Define
Umns(I,  (#g)) as the flow utility of a married household composed of a main earner
with income I and a non-working spouse,
Umns(I,  (#g)) = µ
[(1   ) (#g)I]1  
1    + (1  µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))I]1  
1    . (6)
Since the choice of the spouse working or not is done by the household, the house-
hold pays  and the spouse works if
⇤g ⌘
Z
(Ums (I,  (#g))  Umns(I,  (#g)))f(I|g)dI >  (7)
where f(I|g) is the endogenous distribution of main earner income for group g.
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Define Prob(work) as the probability of working for a spouse, then,
Prob(work) = M [
Z
(Ums (I,  (#g))  Umns(I,  (#g)))f(I|g)dI]. (8)
Note that once we condition on income of the main earner, I , #g only impacts the
probability of working of the spouse via  (#g). Later, when we proceed to our em-
pirical analysis, this is useful by allowing us to control for variation in   due to # via
Prob(Work). Empirically, Prob(Work) is the labor force participation of married
women. In what follows, I omit the notation  (#g) to make it lighter. However,
when we arrive to the empirical section, this dependancy will be important as it will
be informative for our identification strategy and the conditions for it’s validity.
Furthermore, note that eventhough the household is making a joint decision,
variation in  (#) still affects total household utility. The intuition is that a larger
share of total household income going to the spouse, larger  , affects the household
differently depending on µ. If there is a large weight on spousal utility (high µ)
and most of the income is being taken by the main earner (low  ), we expect that
a larger   increases household utility. If, on the other hand, little weight is put on
spousal utility (low µ) and most of the income is being taken by the spouse (high
 ) then an increase in   is likely to be detrimental for total household utility.
Let us consider the problem of a currently operating entrepreneur. Each main
earner has innate entrepreneurial ability of ✓. Let ✓ 2 [1, T ] and ✓ ⇠ G(✓|g). Let the
productivity of the firm be a function of an economy-wide productivity component
y. In other words, y is the same for all entrepreneurs in a same economy while ✓ is
an individual ability component that varies across entrepreneurs. Finally, let each
business project an entrepreneur starts to be characterized by a productivity z. Let
z 2 [0,⌥]. Throughout the life of the firm, productivity z is fixed. The individual
entrepreneur takes wages w and firm productivity components z, ✓ and y as given
and chooses how many individuals n to hire. Hence, they solve9
⇡(z) = max
n
y✓ezn↵   wn (9)
9The profit maximization problem is static because there are no search frictions.
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which gives
















Next we go over the value functions of the married and unmarried households. Note
that for the married households these depend on the fixed cost, , of the spouse.
For the remainder of this section we omit the dependance of value functions on ✓ to
make the notation lighter. With probability   the firm fails and the main earner is
forced to shut down the firm. Let Ju(z) represent the value of being an entrepreneur




1    +  (B
u   Ju(z)). (12)
For married households, the main earner gets a share (1   )(1   ) of the income
of the household and the spouse gets a share (1    ) . The total income of the
household is composed of both the income of the entrepreneur ⇡(z) and of the
spouse wh⇤. Let Jm(z,) represent the value function for a household composed
of an entrepreneur running a project of quality z and a spouse that has working cost
 and Bm() represent the value function for a household composed of a failed
entrepreneur with a spouse of working cost . Then for  < ⇤, the spouse works
and the value function of the household, Jm(z,), is
rJm(z,) = µ
[(1   ) (#g)(⇡(z) + wh⇤)]1  
1    +(1 µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))(⇡(z) + wh⇤)]1  
1   
   h⇤ +  (Bw()  Jm(z,)). (13)
Note that the difference between the value of being an entrepreneur between the
two groups depends on any differences in the value of having failed a business, Bm
versus Bu, and differences in their flow utility. In particular, while the unmarried
individual gets to keep all of the profits, the married household pools the income
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of the main earner and the spouse. Note that the income as an entrepreneur when
unmarried is increasing in z.10 On the other hand, for the married household as
their entrepreneurial profits, ⇡(z), increase in z, hours worked by the spouse, h,
weakly decrease. Hence, spousal income decreases, partially offsetting some of
the increase in income due to higher profits. This decrease in hours worked by the
spouse increases household flow utility by saving on the costs of working for the
spouse but decreases total household income. This is an important effect which we
call the spousal sharing effect. It can be shown that there exists a  ̂, such that
8  <  ̂ the pecuniary effect of lower total household income dominates over the
saved cost of working. Proposition 1 below states this formally.
Proposition 1 There exists a  ̂ such that 8  <  ̂, the derivative of the flow utility
of an unmarried household running a firm with respect to the business productivity
z is larger than the derivative of the flow utility of a married household composed
of an entrepreneur and a working spouse with respect to business productivity z.
From hereafter we focus on the cases where   <  ̂. This is the first part of the
spousal sharing effect. It compresses the benefits to entrepreneurship for married
individuals relative to the unmarried. Note that conditional on already operating a
firm, business project productivity z is fixed over time. Hence, the spousal sharing
effect does not change the risk for an already operating entrepreneur. Instead, it
compresses the value of becoming an entrepreneur, Jm(z,).
When  > ⇤, the spouse does not work. In this case, the value of a being a married
household with an entrepreneur is given by
rJm(z,) = µ
[(1   ) (#g)⇡(z)]1  
1    + (1  µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))⇡(z)]1  
1   
+  (Bm()  Jm(z,)). (14)
When this happens, the married household gets less flow utility than the unmarried
10Recall that profits, ⇡(z), is increasing in z.
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individual.11 This is the second part of the spousal sharing effect. It decreases the
incentives to entrepreneurship by decreasing the benefits of entrepreneurship. As
shall be clear in what follows, the spousal sharing effect also increases the cost of
failure in entrepreneurship when the spouse is not working.
Finally, note that having children,   > 0, decreases total household income.
This decreases the benefits to entrepreneurship since a part of the profits is shared
with the children. This effect of children on decreasing the benefits to entrepreneur-
ship is present independent if the spouse is working or not. This is the first part of
the offspring effect. As shall become clear children also increase the cost of busi-
ness failure and change the opportunity cost to entrepreneurship.
Once the business fails, the individual works as a wage worker but is forced to
pay a cost c and is not allowed to enter entrepreneurship. Hence, the flow income
of the main earner in this case is w   c. The individual exits bankruptcy back to
wage work with probability p. Let W u denote the value of being an unmarried wage
worker. Then, the value of being bankrupt and unmarried, Bu, is
rBu =
(w   c)1  
1    + p(W
u   Bu). (16)
For married households, the main earner gets a share (1  )(1   ) of total house-
hold income and the spouse gets a share (1    ) . The total income of the house-
hold in this case is composed of the income of the main earner, wage minus cost
of bankruptcy, w   c, and the income of the spouse, wsh⇤. Let Wm() represent
the value function for a household composed of a worker and a spouse with cost
of working . Then, for  < ⇤, the spouse works and the value function for a
11To see this note that
µ
[(1   )( (#g))⇡(z)]1  













household with a failed entrepreneur, Bm(), is given by
rBm() = µ
[(1   ) (#g)(w   c+ wh⇤)]1  
1    +(1 µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))(w   c+ wh⇤)]1  
1   
   h⇤ + p(Wm()  Bm()) (17)
The difference in the value of being bankrupt between the two groups depends on
the difference in continuation values, Wm versus W u and in differences in flow
utility. In particular, while for unmarried individuals income falls by the cost of
bankruptcy, c, married housholds benefit from the income of the spouse, conditional
on the spouse working. When the business of the main earner fails, spouses weakly
increase working hours h. The result is an increase in spousal earning which par-
tially offsets the decrease in income suffered by married failed entrepreneurs. We
call this effect the spousal insurance effect. This effect compresses the costs of
business failure for married households.
If the spouse does not work ( > ⇤), then the value of being a married house-
hold with a failed entrepreneur is given by
rBm() = µ
[(1   ) (#g)(w   c)]1  
1    +(1 µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))(w   c)]1  
1   
+ p(Wm()  Bm()). (18)
In this case the married household flow utility is less than that of the unmarried
individual.12 This increases the costs to entrepreneurship for married households
with a spouse not working. Note that this comes from having to share income
with a not working spouse, even when income is low like in a situation of business
failure. This is another part of the spousal sharing effect.
12To see this note that
µ
[(1   )( (#g))(w   c)]1  
1    + (1  µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))(w   c)]1  
1   
< µ
[(1   )(w   c)]1  
1    +(1 µ)
[(1   )(w   c)]1  
1    =






Finally, note that having children,   > 0, decreases even more the income of the
household with a failed entrepreneur. Children increase the cost of business failure.
Furthermore, this effect of children is present regardless of whether the spouse is
working or not. This is the second part of the offspring effect. Note that this
second part goes in the same direction as the first part by making entrepreneurship
less desirable for married households relative to unmarried households due to the
presence of children.
The three parts of the spousal sharing effect and both parts of the offspring effect
described up until now make entrepreneurship less desirable for married households
relative to the unmarried. On the other hand, the spousal insurance effect makes
entrepreneurship more desirable among married households by compressing the
costs of failure.
Finally, the last value functions are those for households when the main earner
is working. Let Wm be the value function of a married household with the main
earner working and W u be the value function for an unmarried household with the
main earner working. For both types of households, business projects arrive at rate
 . Each project is associated to a firm productivity z drawn from an exogenous
distribution F (z). Households choose optimally which projects to implement com-
paring the value of opening a firm (Jm(z,) if married and Ju(z) if unmarried)
to the value of being a wage worker. Let zu represent the firm productivity that
makes the unmarried household indifferent between opening a firm and continuing
to work. Then,
Ju(zu) = W u. (20)
It follows that the value of an unmarried household composed of a working main
earner is given by
rW u =
w1  
1    +  
Z
zu
(Ju(z) W u)dF (z). (21)
Let zm() represent the firm productivity that makes the married household
indifferent between allocating the main earner to entrepreneurship or to wage work.
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Then,
Jm(zm(),) = Wm(). (22)
For married households, the spouse gets a share (1    )  of total household
income and the main earner gets a share (1    )(1    ). When the main earner is
working, total household income is given by the income of the main earner, their
wage, w, and the income of the spouse, wh⇤. Let Wm() be the value function of
the married household with main earner working and spouse with cost of working .
Then, for  < ⇤, the spouse works and the value function of a married household
with main earner working is
rWm() = µ
[(1   ) (#g)(w + wh⇤)]1  
1    +(1 µ)
[(1   )(1   (#g))(w + wh⇤)]1  
1   




It is important to note that throughout we have omitted the dependancy of value
functions on ✓ to make the notation lighter. But of course, given that dependency,
zm and zu both depend on entrepreneurial ability ✓.
If the spouse does not work ( > ⇤), then the value of a married household
with the main earner working, Wm(), is given by
rWm() = µ
[(1   ) (#g)w]1  







Finally, note that having children,   > 0, decreases the total income of the mar-
ried household with the main earner working. This is true independent if the spouse
is working or not. This is the third part of the offspring effect. By decreasing the
total income of the household when the main earner is working, children decrease
the opportunity cost to entrepreneurship. We conclude that the offspring effect
has an ambiguous effect on the incentives to start a firm. Despite the simplified
modelling of children, we already obtain quite a lot of channels via which children
affect the entrepreneurship decision of married households. In the model, children
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induce a higher cost of failing the business, a lower benefit to a productive business
and a lower opportunity cost to entrepreneurship.
In total, we have three channels via which spouses affect entrepreneurship :
spousal sharing effect, spousal insurance effect and offspring effect.
Next, to understand the relevance of the selection channel for productivity,
Proposition 2 states the condition for average productivity to be increasing in the
measure of married individuals MR.
Proposition 2 Average firm productivity, E[z], is increasing in the measure of mar-
ried individuals, MR, if zm > zu and decreasing otherwise.
It follows that relative selection of both groups (zm versus zu) is crucial for our
understanding of how changes in the marriage rate affect the firm productivity dis-
tribution.
2.1 Outcomes and Spouses
We are interested in how having a spouse affects the entry into entrepreneurship
and the size of firms. In our model, these objects are both captured by the selection
thresholds, zm for the married, and zu for the unmarried. In what follows, we dis-
cuss how these thresholds map into differences in firm outcomes and the channels
that generate differences in these thresholds. The discussion that follows should be
understood as conditional on a value for ✓ and . Once, we bring model to the data
we will take into account the dependency of our value functions on ✓ and .
The entry rate into entrepreneurship for married and unmarried individuals is deter-
mined respectively by
 (1  F (zm)) (25)
and
 (1  F (zu)). (26)
From the expressions above we see that a higher threshold decreases the entry rate
of the corresponding group.
Given the expression in equation (73), the average size of firms among married

































































Hence, we conclude that average size of firms for a group (married versus unmar-
ried) is increasing in the thresholds chosen by that group. To summarize, if we want
to know whether married individuals enter more or less and create smaller or larger
firms, we must uncover the relationship between their productivity thresholds:
zm 7 zu. (33)
The direction of this inequality depends on the relative strenghts of the channels we
discussed : spousal sharing effect, spousal insurance effect and offspring effect.
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The spousal sharing effect decreases the benefits to entrepreneurship for mar-
ried households. Firstly, it means that a higher profit for the main earner in a married
couple is partially offset by a spouse working less hours. Secondly, for couples with
non-working spouses, firm failure becomes more costly because the little income
left still needs to be shared with the non working spouse. All else equal, this pushes
married households to be more selective on which business projects to implement
(higher zm) relative to unmarried individuals (zu). The result is a lower entry rate,
higher average productivity and higher average size among firms created by married
individuals.
The spousal insurance effect decreases the cost of business failure for married
households. All else equal, this pushes married households to be less selective on
which business projects to implement (lower zm) relative to unmarried individuals
(zu). The result is a higher entry rate, lower average productivity and lower average
size among firms created by married households.
Finally, the offspring effect has an ambiguous effect on entrepreneurship. Firstly,
children increase the cost of business failure. The reason is that the lower house-
hold income during business failure is decreased further by the need to set aside
some of that income for the children. Secondly, children decrease the benefit to
a successful business. Any increase in firm profits gives rise to a smaller increase
in household consumption due to the requirement to share a part of that income
with the children. These two channels make married individuals more selective
on which business projects to implement (higher zm) relative to the unmarried in-
dividuals (zu). The result is a lower entry rate and higher average productivity
and size among firms created by married households. On the other hand, children
decrease total household income when the main earner is working. Since this rep-
resents the opportunity cost to entrepreneurship, this pushes married households to
be less selective on which business projects to implement (higher zm) relative to
unmarried households (zu). Hence, this third part of the offspring effect induces
higher entry rate and lower average productivity and size for firms created by mar-
ried households. Taken together, these three channels imply the offspring effect
has an ambiguous effect on entry rates into entrepreneurship, average productivity
and firm size for married relative to unmarried households.
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In the next sections, I go over the data and the empirical strategy used to test
the strength of these different effects. Note that although the model implies an
ambiguous response of entry rates and average size of firms to changes in marriage
rates, it imposes the restriction that any variable that changes the entry rate into
entrepreneurship must change the average size of firms in the opposite direction.
This comes from the model restriction that we are identifying changes in average
size due to changes in the selection of business projects upon entry. As shall become
clear, it turns out this restriction holds in the data.
Before proceeding to the data analysis we consider the endogenous decision to
marry. This is important since it will make clear the source of endogeneity that
needs to be overcome to estimate the effect of marriage on entrepreneurship.
2.2 Endogenous decision to marry
Up until now, we have considered the marital status of an individual as exogenous.
In this section, we formalize the decision of individuals to marry or not. The ob-
jective is not to provide a full detailed theory of the formation and dissolution of
marriage. Rather, we use this formalization to inform us how entrepreneurial ability
✓ and economy wide productivity y affect both marriage and entrepreneurial out-
comes. This is an important point given our desire to empirically estimate the effect
of marriage on entrepreneurship.
With this objective in mind, we consider a simple form of endogenous marriage
formation. Ex-ante, individuals choose to marry based on the expected value of be-
ing married and unmarried. In particular, individuals make this choice under the veil
of ignorance, before knowledge of whether they enter or not entrepreneurship. Fur-
thermore, assume individuals cannot direct search towards spouses of a particular
cost of working, . They weigh each state by the equilibrium measure of individu-
als of same entrepreneurial ability as themselves in each state. Furthermore, recall
individual belongs to a group g. Each group g has an idyossincratic utility value of
vg associated to being married. Let vg ⇠ H(v). Let Wmh (, ✓) represent the value
for a main earner of ability ✓ of working and being married to a spouse of type .
Let Jmh (z,, ✓) represent the value for a main earner of ability ✓ of being married
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to a spouse of type  and running a firm with business project productivity of z. Let
Bmh (, ✓) be the value for a main earner of ability ✓ of being married to a spouse of
type  and having failed a firm. In Online Appendix A we describe in further detail
value functions Jmh (z,, ✓), Bmh (, ✓) and Wmh (, ✓). Note that the value functions
JMh , WMh and Bmh are the value functions for the married main earner and the values
functions Jm, Wm and Bm are those for the married household. Once married the
couple draws a cost for the spouse to work, . This cost is paid by the household if
and only if  < ⇤g. This cost  is shared between spouse and main earner accord-
ing to their weight in the household (µ and 1  µ respectively). Hence, the ex-ante
value of marriage, V M(✓, g), for an individual of ability ✓ from group g is










Jmh (z,, ✓) M(z,, ✓)dz)dM()  (1  µ)
Z ⇤g
dM() + vg. (34)
The ex-ante value of being unmarried, V U(✓, g), for an individual of ability ✓ from
group g is
V U(✓, g) ⌘ eu(✓)W u(✓) + bu(✓)Bu(✓) +
Z
zu(✓)
Ju(z, ✓) U(z, ✓)dz. (35)










Jmh (z,, ✓) M(z,, ✓)dz)dM()  (1  µ)
Z ⇤g






Ju(z, ✓) U(z, ✓)dz. (36)
Now allow for the possibility that individuals need to find a partner to marry. This
probability of meeting someone depends on the the gender ratio, ratio of women rel-
ative to men, #g, of their particular group. Hence, let Pr(M = 1) be the probability
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a man marries, then,
Pr(M = 1) = q(#g) · Pr(V M(✓, g)  (1  µ)
Z ⇤g
dM() + vg > V
U(✓, g))
⌘ q(#g)Pr(vg > V U(✓, g)  V M(✓, g) + (1  µ)
Z ⇤g
dM())
= q(#g)(1 H(V U(✓, g)  V M(✓, g) + (1  µ)
Z ⇤g
dM())). (37)
where q0() > 0. Taking a first order linearization of the set of value functions for
✓, y and ⇤g gives us the probability of marriage as a linear function of individual
entrepreneurial ability, ✓, economy specific productivity, y, the gender ratio, #g, and
the probability of spouses working, Prob(work)g. The proposition below states this
formally.
Proposition 3 The probability to marry Pr(M = 1) is characterized by
Pr(M = 1) = C0 + C1✓ + C2y + C3#g + C4Prob(work)g. (38)
A higher entrepreneurial ability increases the individual’s incentive to start a firm
which in turn makes the effect of marriage on the value of entrepreneurship more
important for these individuals. This intuition makes clear that entrepreneurial abil-
ity, ✓, affects both the decision to start a firm conditional on marital status as well
as the decision to marry. Similarly, in productive economies (with higher y), in-
dividuals are more prone to start a firm. This in turn makes the differences in the
value of entrepreneurship between married and unmarried all the more important
for this individual. As a result, a change in y affects both the decision to start a firm
conditional on marriage and the decision to marry.
It follows that a naive regression of entry into entrepreneurship on marriage
suffers from endogeneity due to both y and ✓. When we bring the model to the data
we implement a strategy to overcome this endogeneity problem. Crucially, we need
an instrument that captures variation in Pr(M = 1) uncorrelated to the decision to
start a firm. From equation (38) above we see that natural candidate is the gender
ratio, #g. To do so, we will need to control for any direct effect of the gender ratio,
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#g, on the decision to start a firm.
When we bring the model to the data we will consider variation across local
economies and countries of birth. In particular, we consider each local economy-
time period pair to be described by the model layed out in this section. Each group
g will be a country of birth. In line with this logic, Proposition 4 below derives
the marriage rate for a particular group g of an economy c and year t as a function
of the average entrepreneurial ability,
R
✓dGc(✓|g)(✓), the economy-specific shock,
yc,t, and the gender ratio for that group g in that economy c, #c,g,t.
Proposition 4 Suppose there exists a large number of economies c all of which are
characterized by the model described in this section. Let Gc(✓|g) be the distribution
of entrepreneurial ability ✓ conditional on being from group g in economy c. Then,
the aggregate marriage rate MRc,g,t for group g in economy c at time t can be
written as
MRc,g,t = C0 + C1
Z
✓dGc(✓|g) + C2yc,t + C3#c,g,t + C4log(Prob(work))c,g,t.
(39)
2.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section I go over the main empirical strategies used to disentangle the relative
strengths of each channel via which spouses affect the individual’s decision to start
a firm. The strategy uses variation across cities and countries of birth. Intuitively,
consider each city as a local economy described by our model in the previous sec-
tion.
We want to test the model prediction that the effect of marriage on the entry rate
into entrepreneurship must have the opposite sign of the effect of marriage on the
average size of firms. This restriction comes directly from our selection mechanism,
in which firm heterogeneity is being driven by the entry decision of entrepreneurs.
To our knowledge this is one of the first papers to empirically test this restriction of
firm selection mechanisms.
Our main objective is to verify which effect from the theory (spousal sharing
effect, spousal insurance effect and offspring effect) is the strongest. To verify
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this we use variation across different cities and immigrant groups in Canada.13 Let
c denote city, t year and g denote individuals born in country g, then the entry into
entrepreneurship ERc,g,t and the log of average size of firms log(SYc,g,t) can be
written as a function of the marriage rate for that group g in that city c, MRc,g,t.
This is formally stated in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5 Suppose there exists a large number of economies c all of which are
characterized by the model described in the previous section. Let Gc(✓|g) be the
distribution of innate ability ✓ for group g, in economy c. Let  c,g,t be the share
of the main earner income that the spouse consumes in economy c for group g at
time t. Let Prob(work)c,g,t be the probability that spouses from group g in local
economy c, year t work. Then, the entry rate into entrepreneurship ER and the
average size of firms SY in each of these c economies for a group g can be written
as










 c,g,t = ⇣0 + ⇣1#c,g,t (42)
This proposition makes clear that any instrument for marriage rates MRc,g,t must
be independant of variation in  c,g,t, yc,t and
R
✓dG(✓|g). Importantly, note that
the only channel via which the gender ratio, #c,g,t, has an effect on ERc,g,t and
log(SY )c,g,t is via the income sharing parameter,  c,g,t. If we are able to control for
13We include native Canadians in our groups but our results are robust to using only foreign born.
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 c,g,t, we can control for the effect of #c,g,t on entrepreneurial outcomes, and use
#c,g,t as an instrument for marriage rates.
Now recall that our model implies a tight relationship between the probability of
working for married women, Prob(work)c,g,t, and the income sharing parameter,
 c,g,t. Proposition 6 below makes clear that we can use Prob(work)c,g,t and average
income of married men,
R
Idµc,t(I|g), as a proxies to control for  c,g,t.
Proposition 6 Suppose there exists a large number of economies c all of which
are characterized by the model described in the previous section. Let µc,t(I|g) be
the income distribution of married main earners in group g in economy c at time
t. Finally, let Prob(work)c,g,t have measurement error, "c,g,t, characterized by its
first differences,  "c,g,t, being i.i.d and E[ "c,g,t] = 0. Then the probability of
working for married women in economy c in group g, time t, Prob(work)c,g,t, can
be approximated by
Prob(work)c,g,t =  0,4 +  1,4 c,g,t +  2,4
Z
Idµc,t(I|g) + "c,g,t (43)
where "c,g,t is measurement error.
From the expression above we can write  c,g,t as a function of Prob(Work)c,g,t andR







✓dG(✓|g) + ⇣2,3"c,g,t. (44)
and





✓dG(✓|g) + ⇣3,3"c,g,t. (45)
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Note that Prob(Work)c,g,t is the female labor force participation and
R
Idµc,t(I|g)
is average income of married men for group g, economy c and time t. We can
measure and control for these variables, which leaves only yc,t,
R
✓dG(✓|g) and
"c,g,t as unobserved error terms. Next, we take first differences to obtain
 ERc,g,t =  1,1 MRc,g,t + ⇣2,1 Prob(Work)c,g,t + ⇣2,2 
Z
Idµc,t(I|g)
+  3,1 yc,t + ⇣2,3 "c,g,t. (46)
and
 log(SY )c,g,t =  0,2+ 1,2 MRc,g,t+⇣3,1 Prob(Work)c,g,t+⇣3,2 
Z
Idµc,t(I|g)
+  3,2 yc,t + ⇣3,3 "c,g,t. (47)
Hence, after taking first differences the term
R
✓dG(✓|g) disappears. Given our
equations above, all we need is an instrument for the change in marriage rates,
 MRc,g,t, which is uncorrelated to changes in economy specific productivity shocks,
 yc,t. Looking back at our expression for marriage rates in equation (39) and taking
first differences we get
 MRc,g,t = C2 yc,t + C3 #c,g,t + C4 Prob(work)c,g,t. (48)
The expression above for  MRc,g,t makes explicit that a candidate for changes in
marriage rates independant of  yc,t are changes in the gender ratio,  #c,g,t. We
adopt this approach, such that our instrument IVc,g,t for  MRc,g,t is defined as
IVc,g,t =  #c,g,t. (49)
The key restriction that allows for this empirical strategy is that we control for
the impact of  #c,g,t on entrepreneurial outcomes by controlling for female la-




Idµc,t(I|g). To summarize our two main specifications are
 ERc,g,t =  1,1 MRc,g,t + ⇣2,1 Prob(Work)c,g,t + ⇣2,2 
Z
Idµc,t(I|g)
+  3,1 yc,t + ⇣2,3 "c,g,t. (50)
and
 log(SY )c,g,t =  0,2+ 1,2 MRc,g,t+⇣3,1 Prob(Work)c,g,t+⇣3,2 
Z
Idµc,t(I|g)
+  3,2 yc,t + ⇣3,3 "c,g,t. (51)
where  MRc,g,t is instrumented by  #c,g,t. Recall that we have the prediction from
the model that
•  1,1 > 0 if and only if  1,2 < 0,
•  1,1 < 0 if and only if  1,2 > 0.
3 Data and Empirical Results
In this section we go over the data we use and our empirical results.
3.1 Data and Measurement
The data used for the empirical analysis is the Canadian Employer-Employee Dy-
namics Database (CEEDD). It contains the entire universe of Canadian tax filers,
and privately owned incorporated firms. The dataset links employees to firms and
firms to their corresponding owners across space and time. This is achieved by
linking individual tax information (T1 files, individual tax returns), with linked
employer-employee information (T4 files)14 and firm ownership and structure in-
formation (T2 files). T2 forms are the Canadian Corporate Income Tax forms. In-
14According to Canadian law, each employer must file a T4 file for each of her employees. The
equivalent in the US is the W-2, Wage and Tax Statement. In this file, the employer identifies herself,
identifies the employee and reports the labour earnings of the employee.
26
side the T2 files we find the schedule 50 in which each corporation must list all
owners with at least 10% of ownership. This allows us to link each firm to individ-
ual entrepreneurs. The equivalent in the US to the schedule 50 of the T2 form is
the schedule G of 1120 form (Corporate Income Tax Form in the US). The data is
annual and is available from 2001 to 2013. This constitutes an advantage relative
to employer-employee firm population data from the US, which does not allow the
researcher to identify the owners of the firm.
Furthermore, relative to other employer-employee linked datasets it is unique
since it contains as well the link between individuals and their spouses. This allows
us to directly observe whether individuals start their firm with their spouse and
whether the spouse works for the firm. These are important channels that we omit
from our model exactly because we are able to control for them empirically. In par-
ticular, we do this by considering our main specifications excluding joint ventures
started by both spouses and businesses for which individuals hire their spouses.
The data is annual with information on both firms and individuals. Using this
database, it is possible to disentangle the characteristics of the business owner and
the firm. We concentrate on firms that contribute to job creation by hiring employ-
ees. This is done by focusing on employers instead of self-employed individuals.
We focus on outcomes for men between 25 and 65 years old to focus on individuals
with high labor market attachment.15
Business owners are identified as individuals present in the schedule 50 files
from the T2 that have employees. Wage workers are identified as those who are not
entrepreneurs and report a positive employment income on their T4. We use the
information in the T1 files to control for characteristics such as gender, age and to
identify marital status. We identify as married all couples and not just individuals
legally married.16 Finally, the dataset is also linked to immigrant landing files dating
back to 1980. This allows us to observe the country of birth of all individuals that
arrived at 1980 or later in Canada.
The linkage between each firm and its corresponding owner is only available
for privately owned incorporated firms. Incorporated firms have two key charac-
15In the robustness section we show our results are robust to considering women.
16This is possible in data because we are able to identify cohabitation.
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teristics which correspond closely to how economists typically think about firms :
limited liability and separate legal identity. Furthermore, there is a growing litera-
ture showing that incorporated firms tend to be larger and that they are more likely
to contribute to aggregate employment. 17 There is also evidence that there is lit-
tle transition from unincorporated to incorporated status.18 These facts highlight
how incorporated firms with employees are the most appropriate measure of firms
to consider if we are interested in the interplay between entrepreneurship and the
aggregate economy. Another reason to focus on incorporated firms with employees
is Canadian corporte law. In Canada there are significant tax advantages for incor-
porating as a higher earner. So to exclude from my analysis high-earning workers
that incorporate exclusively due to tax purposes, I focus on incorporated firms with
employees. This dataset represents an important improvement in that aspect, by
allowing us to focus on firms that contribute to aggregate output and employment.
For the remainder of the paper, the empirical definition of an entrepreneur is
an owner and founder of a privately owned incorporated firm with employees. We
consider only founders of firms to restrict ourselves to entrepreneurs, as those in
our model, that start new ventures. Although interesting in its own right, the study
of the choice to buy shares in an already existing firm is left for future research.
Our measure of local labor market is that of economic regions. These are equiv-
alent to commuting zones in the US. There is a total of 76 such regions in Canada.
We define a startup as a firm that is at most 1 year old. In our dataset the
average size of startups is 6 employees while that of all firms is 13 employees.
The equivalent for the US economy is an average of 6 employees for startups and
an average of 23 employees for the entire firm population during the period of
2001  2013.19 Hence, while the average size of startups is similar, older firms tend
to be smaller in Canada.
Below we present summary statistics for the gender ratio (number of women
relative to men). Table 1 presents summary statistics for the gender ratio across dif-
17Glover and Short (2010) document that incorporated entrepreneurs operate larger businesses,
accumulate more wealth, and are on average more productive than unincorporated entrepreneurs.
18Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show that there is little transition from unincorporated to incor-
porated status.
19The numbers for the US were calculated by the author using BDS data.
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ferent economic regions and countries of birth for the year 2005. Each observation
represents an economic region/country of birth pair. We see there is large variation
in the gender ratio in our data.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Gender Ratio across Eco-
nomic Regions and Immigrant groups for 2005
Mean Standard Deviation # of Observations
0.881 0.8813 7737
Notes: Summary Statistics for Gender Ratio across Economic
Regions and Country of Birth groups for 2005.
Next, we want to see how much variation we have across different country of
birth groups within an economic region. We plot summary statistics for the gender
ratio across different country of birth groups within the economic region of Toronto
in 2005 (first row) and of Winnipeg in 2005 (second row). Table 2 shows there
is quite a lot of variation across country of birth groups. In the case of Toronto,
the average gender ratio is of 101 women per 100 men and the standard deviation
is of 55 women per 100 men. The number of observations in the first row is the
number of country of birth groups in Toronto in 2005. In the case of Winnipeg,
the average gender ratio is 92.7 women per 100 men and the standard deviation is
of 92.5 women per 100 men. The number of observations in the second row is the
number of country of birth groups in Winnipeg in 2005.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Gender Ratio across Immigrant groups for 2005
in Toronto and Winnipeg
Economic Region Mean Standard Deviation # of Observations
Toronto 1.01 0.55 217
Winnipeg 0.927 0.925 169
Notes: Summary Statistics for Gender Ratio across Country of Birth groups for 2005
in Toronto and for 2005 in Winnipeg. Each observation is a country of birth group in
Toronto in 2005 (first row) or a country of birth group in Winnipeg in 2005 (second
row).
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Next, we plot summary statistics for the gender ratio across different economic
regions for a given country of birth in 2005. Table 3 below plots the summary
statistics for the gender ratio across economic regions for the Argetina born popula-
tion (first row), South Korea born population (second row), Russia born population
(third row) and Uganda born population (fourth row).20 In the first row we see that,
for the Argentina born population, the average gender ratio is 103 women per 100
men and the standard deviation is 78 women per 100 men. In the second row we see
that, for the South Korea born population, the average gender ratio is 105 women
per 100 men and the standard deviation is 77 women per 100 men. The third row
shows that, for the Russia born population, the average gender ratio is 152 women
per 100 men and the standard deviation is 159 women per 100 men. Finally, in the
fourth row, the Table shows that for the Uganda born population the average gender
ratio is 83 women per 100 men and the standard deviation is 75 women per 100
men. The number of observations in each row represents the number of economic
regions in 2005 for which there were people of that country of birth. Hence, each
observation represents an economic region in 2005.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Gender Ratio across Economic Regions for
given Country of Birth in 2005
Country of Birth Mean Standard Deviation # of Observations
Argentina 1.03 0.785 56
South Korea 1.05 0.767 60
Russia 1.52 1.595 61
Uganda 0.83 0.746 44
Notes: Summary Statistics for Gender Ratio across Economic Regions in 2005 for
Argentina born population (first row), for South Korea born population (second
row), for Russia born population (third row), for Uganda born population (fourth
row). Number of observations in each row represent the number of economic re-
gions in 2005 that had the given country of birth.
20These are just some examples since it would be too much to present information for all countries
of birth. Since we have the full universe of Canada, in our data we have information for all countries
of birth and all economic regions.
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Like previously mentioned one concern is that most businesses are started jointly
by spouses something that is absent in our model. Looking in our data we find
that only 29% of new firms started are started by both spouses. Furthermore, as
explained previously in our main specifications we verify our results remain un-
changed once we proceed to excluding these joint ventures.
Another possible concern is if spouses substitute from working for another firm
to working for the firm started by their partner. In this case, we might wrongly
interpret a positive impact of marriage on entrepreneurship as due to insurance when
instead it is due to spouses working for their partner. In the data, we find that
only 16.26% of new entries into entrepreneurship are accompanied by the spouse
being reported as employee of the business. Furthermore, we also verify our main
specifications are robust to excluding the subset of businesses for which the spouse
works for the new firm started by their partner.
One possible concern with our identification strategy is the potential lack of ho-
mophily in marriage in Canada. In particular, we might be worried that due to the
high level of immigration from all around the world most couples are composed of
two individuals born in different countries. A recent brief by Statistics Canada for
201121 shows that of all couples in Canada : 66.9% are between two Canadian born,
18.2% are between two immigrants born in the same country, 3.7% are between two
immigrants of different countries of origin and 11.2% between one Canadian born
and one immigrant. It follows that 85% of couples were between individuals born
in the same country. Among immigrant only couples, 83% of couples were between
individuals born in the same country. This highlights how despite the high immi-
grantion rates to Canada, homophily is still relatively high in the population. This
degree of homophily is also observed in other dimensions. The same brief reports
that 87.6% of couples have one or more common mother tongues. Similarly, 90.2%
of couples are composed of either two individuals that share the same religious
affiliation or two individuals with no religious affiliation.
Finally, we might be worried that some of the variation in the gender ratio in
our data comes from small populations of individuals of a particular country in a
given economic region. In the robustness section we show our results are robust to
21NHS in Brief, Catalogue no. 99-010-X2011003 : Mixed Unions in Canada
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restricting the sample to cells with a minimum of men and women.
3.1.1 Results
In this section we present the main results of our specifications. We also include as
additional controls : year dummies, changes in the share of total employment in the
oil, gas and mining sector,  Shareoilc,t , changes in the share of total employment in
the manufacturing sector,  Sharemanufc,t , changes in the share of total employment
in the service sector,  Shareservc,t , and changes in the share of population in differ-
ent age groups for each economic region, country of birth and year triplet. Results
are robust to not including this extra set of controls.
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the OLS results for our entry rate specification.
We see that marriage rates are significant and positive if we don’t instrument for
it. Column 2 shows that once we instrument for marriage rates, the coefficient flips
sign and increases in magnitude. In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in
the marriage rate is associated to a 0.2 percentage point drop in the entry rate into
entrepreneurship. Given the 1% baseline entry rate in the data, this corresponds to
a 20% drop in the entry rate into entrepreneurship. Finally, row 2 indicates that the
instrument is significant at the first stage. Column 3 indicates the results are robust
to including city dummies.
One concern with our results is that cultural determinants can be simulatenously
determining the change in gender ratio and in entrepreneurship. To deal with this
we can use the variation in changes in the gender ratio of a same immigrant group
across two different locations. To do that we include country of origin dummies.
Column 4 shows our results are robust to using this variation. First stage results for
Table 4 can be found in Table 6 of the Appendix.
Next, we turn to the results on average number of employees of firms. Column
1 of Table 5 indicates marriage,  MRc,g,t, has a small negative insignificant effect
on average size of firms if not instrumented for. Column 2 of Table 5 shows results
for average size of firms once we instrument for marriage rates by our instrument,
the gender ratio. Our estimate implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the
marriage rate increases the average size by 1.13%. In other words, a 10 percentage
point increase in the marriage rate increases average size of firms by 11.3%. Finally
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row 2 indicates that the instrument is significant at the first stage. Column 3 and 4
indicate that the results for average size are robust to the inclusion of city dummies
or country of birth dummies. First stage results for Table 5 can be found in Table 7
of the Online Appendix.22
Note that when we include city dummies we are using variation in changes of
the gender ratio across country of birth groups within a same city. In turn, when
we include country of birth dummies we are using variation in changes of the gen-
der ratio for a same immigrant group across different cities. Hence, these are two
different sources of variation for which there is no reason ex-ante to expect similar
results. Yet, despite this different source of varation, we get similar results in sign,
significance and magnitude regardless of which of these two sources of variation
we use. Furthermore, results for both entry and average size are robust in sign,
mangnitude and significance to including dummies for each country of origin and
year pair.23 Results are also robust to clustering at the economic region c level.
These results are consistent with the prediction of our model that the group
(married vs unmarried) with the highest entry rate into entrepreneurship is also the
one with the lower average firm size. Futhermore, note that this is true for both
the OLS and IV specifications. Our results are consistent with the notion that the
spousal insurance effect is dominated by the spousal sharing effect or by the
negative effects on entrepreneurship of the offspring effect.
The results are in line with married households being more selective in which
business projects to implement. This implies that a decrease in marriage rates in-
duces a fall in average productivity of the economy. In the next section, we look at
this implication more formally.
22The number of observations for the average size regressions are smaller because for a country
of birth, economic region and year triplet to be included we need there to be entrepreneurs in that
triplet. For the entry rate regression we just need there to be individuals in that country of birth,
economic region and year triplet.
23These results are available upon request from the authors.
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Table 4: Main specifications : Entry Rate Regressions
OLS IV IV IV
 MRc,g,t 0.0258  0.219  0.219  0.22
(0.004) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Significance IV for  MRc,t - Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for cities - - Yes -
Dummies for country of birth - - - Yes
Observations 70551 70551 70551 70551
Notes: Regressions of changes in the entry rate into entrepreneurship in economic region
c, country of birth g and year t,  ERc,g,t, on the change in the marriage rate in economic
region c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t. Column 1 reports OLS results. Columns 2, 3
and 4 reports results when using our instrument. Our instrument is the change in the gender
ratio. The gender ratio is defined as the total amount of women divided by total amount of
men for that city c, group g, year t. Specifications include year dummies, changes in female
labor force among married women, in average income among married men, in the share of
population at each triplet (c, g, t) within 3 age groups, in the employment shares in oil and
gas, manufacturing and services sectors. Standard errors are clustered at economic region c
and country of birth g.
Table 5: Main specifications : Average Number of Employees Regressions
OLS IV IV IV
 MRc,g,t  0.038 1.127 1.12 1.13
(0.037) (0.349) (0.35) (0.351)
Significance IV for  MRc,g,t - Yes Yes Yes
Dummies for cities - - Yes -
Dummies for country of birth - - - Yes
Observations 32305 32305 32305 32305
Notes: Regressions of changes in the log of average number of employees of firms in
economic region c, country of birth g and year t,  log(SY )c,g,t, on the change in the
marriage rate in economic region c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t. Column 1 reports
OLS results. Columns 2, 3 and 4 reports results when using our instrument. Our instrument
is the change in the gender ratio. The gender ratio is defined as the total amount of women
divided by total amount of men for that city c, group g, year t. Specifications include year
dummies, changes in female labor force among married women, in average income among
married men, in the share of population at each triplet (c, g, t) within 3 age groups, in the
employment shares in oil and gas, manufacturing and services sectors. Standard errors are
clustered at the economic region c and country of birth g.
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4 Implications for Average Firm Productivity
The results in the previous section make clear that higher marriage rates induce
lower entry rates but larger firms on average. Through the lens of our model, the
results indicate that higher marriage rates induce less firm creation but increase av-
erage firm size and productivity. In this section, we use our results to discipline a
back of the enveloppe bounding exercise of the implied change in average produc-
tivity, E[z]. To do so, note that for all firms in the model we have






















In the short and medium run we can argue  w ⇡ 0 )  log( ↵w )
1
1 ↵ ⇡ 0. Hence,
 log(E[z]) ⇡  log(E[n]). (55)
Given our estimates of the previous section it follows that a 1 percentage point
increase in marriage rates is associated to 1.13% percent increase in average pro-
ductivity. Of course, in the long run we expect wages, w, to adjust. If the main
source of variation in ( ↵w )
1
1 ↵ in the long run is the rise in wages, w, then our es-
timate of the impact of marriage on average firm productivity is a lower bound to
the true long run effect. More generally, our estimate of the response of average
size to marriage rates allows for us to calculate the implied changes in average firm
productivity given any estimate of changes in wages.
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5 Robustness Checks
One concern with our strategy is that there might be economic regions with very
low absolute numbers of individuals from a particular country. This would mean
that a small arrival of individuals from that group produces large fluctuations in the
gender ratio. To address this concern we verify our results are robust to restricting
the use of economic region, country of birth and year triplets with at least 10 women
and 10 men. Our results are unchanged in both sign and significance. In fact, the
magnitudes actually increase. Results can be found in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9
of the Online Appendix.
A second concern with our identification strategy is if there are city specific
shocks  yc,t that are gender biased differentially across different immigrant groups.
As such, men from particular immigrant groups could be more prone to move to
particular cities relative to men of other immigrant groups. The result is that our
instrument would be correlated to the error term. However, this is not a concern
for individuals that arrived at an early age in Canada. As long as the choice of an
immigrant of where to immigrate to in Canada is uncorrelated to the gender of their
child, we can use these early age arrival immigrants to address this concern. Con-
sistent with this argument, we verify our results are robust to using a gender ratio
constructed using only individuals that arrived at age 15 or younger in Canada. Our
results are unchanged in both sign and significance. For entry rates the magnitude
is unchanged while for average size the effect is now stronger. Results can be found
in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 in the Online Appendix.
6 Discussion on Alternative Mechanisms
The theoretical model is purposely tractable to keep the intuition clear and concise.
However, there might be other economic mechanisms affecting entrepreneurship
not present in the model.
Firstly, spouses might help individuals overcome borrowing constraints via wealth
sharing or faster wealth accumulation. There are two ways borrowing constraints
affects outcomes for an individual considering starting a firm. The first is that in-
36
dividuals are constrained in the scale of the firm they create. If married individuals
on average are wealthier we expect higher marriage rates to be associated to higher
average size. This is an alternative narrative for our finding that average size in-
creases with the marriage rate. The second way borrowing constraints might matter
is if there are startup costs to opening a firm. However, both these channels go in
the opposite direction to our finding that higher marriage rates decrease entry rates
into entrepreneurship.
To further verify our findings are not being driven by this borrowing constraint
channel we check that our results are robust to excluding businesses started in high
capital demanding sectors (See Table 10 of the Online Appendix).24 This robust-
ness check alleviates the concern that our results are being driven by borrowing
constraint considerations.
Another potential mechanism ignored by the model is the possibility of joint
entrepreneurship by both main earner and spouse. In particular, married individuals
can be more likely to start a firm because they have the option of starting with their
spouse which also contributes to running the business. Of course this is inherently
hard to measure. But to the extent that a couple running together a firm are both
listed as owners of the business or has the spouse listed as employee of the firm, we
can verify our results are robust to excluding these types of businesses. Indeed, we
verify that our results continue to hold, in both magnitude and significance once we
exclude firms started jointly by both main earner and spouse and firms for which
the spouse is listed as an employee. See Table 11 of the Online Appendix for
results taking out firms started jointly by the couple. See Table 12 of the Online
Appendix for results taking out firms for which the spouse is listed as employee
of the firm. Such robustness tests would be impossible without our link between
business owner, firm, employee and spouse.
Finally, it is tempting to think that our results are driven by lower risk aversion
among men relative to women. This channel can generate a higher risk aversion
among a couple composed of a man and a woman relative to a man. Such a narra-
tive is consistent with married individuals being more selective on which business
24We exclude firms started in : Oil, Mining, Gas, Utilities, Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade, Re-
tail Trade, Transportation and Wharehousing, Information and Cultural Industries and Real Estate.
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projects to implement but for reasons not explicit in the model. However, if this nar-
rative were true we expect the results for women to be the opposite of what we find
for men. We should expect married women to start more and smaller firms relative
to unmarried women. We verified our results are of similar sign and significance
for women (Table 13 of the Online Appendix). In fact, the magnitudes are even
stronger for women. This evidence for women is inconsistent with the narrative of
our results being driven by gender specific risk aversion.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we explore for the first time the importance of spouses and children for
an individdual’s decision to start a firm and the outcomes of that firm. Through a
tractable model we show that spouses affect the decision through different opposing
channels. At one hand, spouses provide insurance against business risk. On the
other hand, spouses decrease the marginal benefit to entrepreneurship by cutting on
working hours when the business is more productive. Finally, having a spouse is
also associated to having children which increase the cost of failure and decrease
the benefits to entrepreneurship.
Using the model, we derive empirical specifications, the source of endogeneity
and a instrumental variable that allow us to bring the model to the data. We show
that marriage is associated to lower entry into entrepreneurship and higher average
number of employees. This is consistent with the importance of the negative effect
of having to share the benefits of a successfull business with a spouse or with the
higher cost of failure/lower benefits associated to having children. Furthermore, the
results are consistent with our selection mechanism in which the effect of marriage
on entry into entrepreneurship and average size of firms has opposite signs. We also
verify our results are robust to a series of alternative mechanisms.
Through the lens of our model our results indicate that a fall in aggregate mar-
riage rates induces a decline in average firm productivity.
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A For Online Publication : Value function for mar-
ried main earner
In this subsection of the Appendix I describe the value functions for married main
earners. Note that these are not the same as the value function of the married house-
hold. First, define as in the body of the text Jmh (z,, ✓) as the value function of the
main earner of ability ✓, married to a spouse with fixed cost of working  and run-
ning a firm of business project productivity z. Let Wmh (, ✓) be the value function
of the main earner of ability ✓ married to a spouse of fixed cost  and working. Let
Bmh (, ✓) be the value function of the main earner of ability ✓ married to a spouse
of fixed cost  and having just failed a business. Then, it follows that




(Jmh (z,, ✓) Wmh (z,, ✓))dF (z) (56)
rJmh (z,, ✓) = u((1   ) (#g)(⇡(z) + wh⇤))  µ h⇤
+  (Bmh (, ✓)  Jmh (z,, ✓)) (57)
and




1    , 8x. (59)
Recall that µ is the weight of the main earner in the household. Hence, µ is also
the share of cost of spouse working and the fixed cost of the spouse paid by the
married main earner.
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B For Online Publication : Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Start by replacing h⇤ by its optimal expression in the flow utility of a married






Now take the derivative of the flow utility of an unmarried household running a firm





Hence, the pecuniary effect of lower total household income dominates over the







In other words, if the above condition holds, the flow utility of an unmarried house-
hold increases faster with z than the flow utility of a married household with the
spouse working. Now note that the maximum possible profit of a firm max
z,✓
⇡(z) is
the one evaluated at maximum values of z and ✓
max
z,✓






























⌘  ̂ >   (65)
we have our desired result.
Proof of Proposition 2. In this section, we solve for the expression for average
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firm productivity in the economy.
Firstly, we solve for the equilibrium measure of entrepreneurs conditional on
a share of married individuals. Let MR be the measure of married individuals in
the economy. Let ⌘m(, ✓) be the share of individuals married to a spouse with
cost of working  and entrepreneurial ability ✓ that are entrepreneurs. Let em(, ✓)
be the share of individuals married to a spouse with cost of working , with en-
trepreneurial ability ✓ that are workers. Let bm(, ✓) be the share of individuals
married to a spouse with cost of working  with entrepreneurial ability ✓ that are
failed entrepreneurs. Similarly define ⌘u(✓), eu(✓) and bu(✓) as the same corre-
sponding shares for unmarried individuals. With a slight abuse of notation, we can
write the share of entrepreneurs for both groups as characterized by
⌘̇i(, ✓) =  (1  F (zi(, ✓)))ei(, ✓)   ⌘i(, ✓), 8i 2 {m, u} (66)
where m = married, u = unmarried. Similarly, the share of individuals bankrupt in
both groups is characterized by
ḃi(, ✓) =  ⌘i(, ✓)  pbi(, ✓), 8i 2 {m, u}. (67)
Finally, the share of workers in both groups is characterized by
⌘i(, ✓) + bi(, ✓) + ei(, ✓) = 1, 8i 2 {m, u}. (68)
Setting ⌘̇(, ✓) = 0 and ḃi(, ✓) = 0 and solving for these shares gives us
ei(, ✓) =
 p
 p+  (1  F (zi(, ✓)))(p+  ) , 8i 2 {m, u}. (69)
bi(, ✓) =
 (1  F (zi(, ✓))) 
 p+  (1  F (zi(, ✓)))(p+  ) , 8i 2 {m, u}. (70)
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⌘i(, ✓) =
 (1  F (zi(, ✓)))p
 p+  (1  F (zi(, ✓)))(p+  ) , 8i 2 {m, u}. (71)
Futhermore, the fraction of individuals i 2 {m, u} of productivity ez, with en-
trepreneurial ability ✓ and with cost of working  for the spouse,  i(z,, ✓), is
characterized by
 ̇i(z,, ✓) =  f(z)ei(, ✓)    i(z,, ✓), 8z   zi(, ✓) i 2 {m, u} (72)
Using the expression for ei(, ✓) and setting  ̇i(z,, ✓) = 0 we get
 i(z,, ✓) =
 f(z)p
 p+  (1  F (zi(, ✓)))(p+  ) . (73)
Let G(✓|g) be the measure of individuals of ability ✓ conditional on belonging
to group g. Let ⌘g be the measure of individuals of group g in the economy. Then,
we can define average firm productivity E[z] in this economy by






















1  F (zu(, ✓)) dzdM()G(✓|g)d✓. (74)
where E[z]m is the average productivity among firms created by married individuals
and E[z]u is the average productivity among firms created by unmarried individuals.
From this expression we can see that E[z] is increasing in the measure of married
individuals, MR, if zm > zu and decreasing otherwise. It follows that relative
selection of both groups (zm versus zu) is crucial for our understanding of how
changes in the marriage rate affect the firm productivity distribution.
Proof of Proposition 3.
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For the first part of this proof I show how to obtain an equation defining thresh-
olds zM and zU . With a slight abuse of notation, define uxS() as the flow utility an
individual receives when married or unmarried (x 2 {u,m}) with spouse of cost of
working  if married25 and in State S, where S 2 {W,B, J) and uxJ(z,) represents
the value of being x 2 {u,m} when running a firm of productivity z.
Now note the fact that, in equilibrium, zM() and zU are defined by
JU(zU) = WU (75)
JW (zW (),) = WM(). (76)
Define value function V x() for x = {u,m} where  only has meaning for x = m.










8x 2 {u,m}. (78)
W x() =




r +  (1  F (zx())) (79)
Using the expression for Jx(z,) and using Jx(zx(),) = W x() we get







(r +  )(r + p)
  rW
x()(r + p+  )
(r + p)(r +  )
(80)
25This flow utility is independant of any  for the unmarried. This is the sense in which it is a
certain abuse of notation.
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Now after some algebra we find
rW x() =
(r + p)(r +  )uxW ()




uxJ(z,)(r + p)dF (z)
(r +  )(r + p) + r(r + p+  ) (1  F (zx()))
+
 (1  F (zx())) uxB()
r(r + p)(r +  ) + r(r +  + p) (1  F (zx())) . (81)
If we replace this expression for rW x in Equation 80 we find equations defining
each treshold zx as a function of parameters and y, ✓, #. Using these optimal
expression for each threshold we can linearize zM(), zU , y, ✓ and  g around the
point (z⇤, z⇤, 1, 1, 1) which gives






1,3 g if   ⇤ (82)






2,3 g if  > 
⇤ (83)
zU = ⇣U0 + ⇣
U
1 y + ⇣
U
2 ✓. (84)
Note that besides the importance of whether  7 ⇤, zM() does not depend on the
level of .











+ (1  Prob(work)g)(⇣M2,0 + ⇣M2,1y + ⇣M2,2✓ + ⇣M2,3 g) (85)
and
zU = ⇣U0 + ⇣
U
1 y + ⇣
U
2 ✓. (86)
Next, linearize equation 85 with zM(), zU , y, ✓,   and Prob(work) around the
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point (z⇤, z⇤, 1, 1, 1, 1) to get
Z










zU = ⇣U0 + ⇣
U
1 y + ⇣
U
2 ✓. (88)
Next, we linearize Pr(M = 1) for zM(), zU , y, ✓,  ,, # and ⇤ around the point
(z⇤, z⇤, 1, 1, 1, 1,) to get











Next, linearize the above expression for Prob(work) and ⇤ around (M(),) giv-
ing us
⇤ = ↵0 + ↵1Prob(work)g. (91)
Finally, we replace ⇤,
R
zMdM() and zU by their expressions given by Equations
(87) and (84) to arrive at
Pr(M = 1) = B0 +B1✓ +B2y +B3 g +B4log(#g) + B5Prob(work)g. (92)
Finally linearize ( g,#g) (for  (#g)) around (1, 1) to get
 g = ⇣0 + ⇣1#g. (93)
Once we replace this expression for  g at the Equation (92) we obtain the desired
result
Pr(M = 1) = C0 + C1✓ + C2y + C3#g + C5Prob(work)g. (94)
Proof of Proposition 4.
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Let there be a large number of economies c characterized by the model described
in the paper. Let Gc(✓|g) be the distribution of entrepreneurial ability ✓ conditional
on being from group g in economy c. Then if we aggregate Equation (38) at the
economy-group wide level we obtain
MRc,g,t = C0 + C1
Z
✓dGc(✓|g) + C2yc,t + C3#c,g,t + C4Prob(work)c,g,t. (95)
Proof of Proposition 5.
For the first part of this proof we need to obtain an equation defining tresholds
zM(✓,) and zU . This just comes directly from the Proof of Proposition 3. Next,
recall the expression for the entry rate in the economy is given by
ERc,g,t = MRc,g,t
Z Z
 (1  F (zM(✓,)i,c,t))dGc(✓|g)dM()
+ (1 MRc,g,t)
Z
 (1  F (zU(✓)i,c,t))dGc(✓|g) (96)
and the one for log average size of firms is given by
























Next, linearize both these expression for (zMi,c,t, zUi,c,t, yc,t, ✓i) around (z⇤, z⇤, 1, 1)
and linearize MRc,t around M̂ . Then replace zMi,c,t and zUi,c,t by their expressions
given by Equations (82), (83) and (84). Next, linearize for (y, ✓,   and Prob(work))
around the point (1, 1, 1, 1) to get :










Finally linearize ( g,#g) around (1, 1) to get
 c,g,t = ⇣0 + ⇣1#c,g,t. (100)
Proof of Proposition 6.
To start consider equation 8. Then, log-linearize the terms (I,  ) inside Ums (I,  g)
and Umns(I,  ) around (I⇤,
1
2) to get
Prob(work|I)c,g,t =  0.4 +  1,4 c,g,t +  2,4I. (101)
Now if we integrate over I we obtain
Prob(work)c,g,t =  0.4 +  1,4 c,g,t +  2,4
Z
Idµc,t(I|g). (102)
where µ(I|g) is the distribution of main earner income for individuals in group g.
Finally, with the assumption that log(Prob(work)c,g,t) is observed with mea-
surement error ✏c,g,t we obtain the desired result
Prob(work)c,g,t =  0.4 +  1,4 c,g,t +  2,4
Z
Idµc,t(I|g) + ✏c,g,t. (103)
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C For Online Publication : First Stage Regressions
In this section we present the results for the first stage regression of our IV regres-
sions. Our endogenous variable is the change in the marriage rate in economic
region c year t,  MRc,t. Our instrument is the sum of the share of individuals from
group g in a economic region c in the first year of the sample multiplied by the
change in marriage rate of individual at group g at the national level in year t.
Table 6: 1st Stage Regression - Entry Rate Regressions
IVc,g,t 0.0371 0.0371 0.0372
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummies for cities - - Yes -
Dummies for country of birth - - - Yes
Observations 70551 70551 70551
Notes: First Stage regression of our endogenous variable (for the entry rate re-
gressions), change in the marriage rate in economic region c, country of birth g,
year t,  MRc,g,t in our instrument, the change in the gender ratio at economic
region c, country of birth g and year t IVc,g,t. The gender ratio is defined as
the total amount of women of that city c, group g, year t divided by the total
amount of men of that city c, group g, year t. Standard errors are clustered at the
economic region c and country of birth g. Results are robust to clustering at just
the economic region c level.
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Table 7: 1st Stage Regression - Average Size Regressions
IVc,g,t 0.0302 0.0302 0.0302
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummies for cities - - Yes -
Dummies for country of birth - - - Yes
Observations 32305 32305 32305
Notes: First Stage regression of our endogenous variable (for the entry rate re-
gressions), change in the marriage rate in economic region c, country of birth g,
year t,  MRc,g,t in our instrument, the change in the gender ratio at economic
region c, country of birth g and year t IVc,g,t.The gender ratio is defined as the
total amount of women of that city c, group g, year t divided by the total amount
of men of that city c, group g, year t. Standard errors are clustered at the eco-
nomic region c and country of birth g. Results are robust to clustering at just the
economic region c level.
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D For Online Publication : Robustness Regressions
Table 8: Main specifications : Robustness Regressions
Dependant Variable  ERc,g,t  log(SY )c,g,t  ERc,g,t  log(SY )c,g,t
IV IV IV IV
 MRc,g,t  0.468 3.01  0.149 3.64
(0.079) (1.05) (0.048) (1.45)
IV using immigrants arrived age  15 No No Yes Yes
Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cells with at least 10 men and 10 women Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30906 23287 10506 9284
Notes: Regressions of changes in entry rate into entrepreneurship,  ERc,g,t and changes in log of average firm size,
 SYc,g,t in economic region c, country of birth g and year t, on the change in the marriage rate in economic region c,
country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t. Columns 1 and 2 report the results when excluding all triples (c, g, t) for which
there is less than 10 men and 10 women. Columns 3 and 4 reports the results when constructing the gender ratio using
only immigrants that arrived to Canada at the age of 15 or earlier. All specifications include year dummies to capture
national trends, changes in female labor force among married women, changes in average income among married
men, changes in the share of population at each triplet (c, g, t) within different age ranges (for 3 different age ranges),
changes in the employment shares of oil and gas sector, changes in the employment shares of the manufacturing sector
and changes in employment shares of the services sector. Standard errors are clustered at the economic region c and
country of birth g level.
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Table 9: Main specifications : Robustness Regressions - 1st Stage
Dependant Variable at 2nd Stage  ERc,g,t  SYc,g,t  ERc,g,t  SYc,g,t
 IVc,g,t 0.033 0.040 0.022 0.020
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
IV constructed with immigrants arrived age  15 No No Yes Yes
Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only cells with at least 10 men and 10 women Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30906 23287 10506 9284
Notes: First Stage regression of our endogenous variable (for the entry rate regressions), change in the marriage
rate in economic region c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t in our instrument, the change in the gender ratio at
economic region c, country of birth g and year t IVc,g,t. Second Stage are regressions of changes in entry rate into
entrepreneurship,  ERc,g,t and changes in log of average firm size,  SYc,g,t in economic region c, country of birth
g and year t, on the change in the marriage rate in economic region c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t. Columns
1 and 2 report the results when excluding all triples (c, g, t) for which there is less than 10 men and 10 women.
Columns 3 and 4 reports the results when constructing the gender ratio using only immigrants that arrived to Canada
at the age of 15 or earlier. All specifications include year dummies to capture national trends, changes in female labor
force among married women, changes in average income among married men, changes in the share of population at
each triplet (c, g, t) within different age ranges (for 3 different age ranges), changes in the employment shares of oil
and gas sector, changes in the employment shares of the manufacturing sector and changes in employment shares of
the services sector. Standard errors are clustered at the economic region c and country of birth g level.
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E For Online Publication : Alternative mechanisms
Table 10 reports results for when we exclude high capital requirement industries.
We set entry into entrepreneurship into high capital industries equal to zero (coded
as a non-entry for the purpose of these regressions). Hence, the number of observa-
tions for our entry into entrepreneurship regression remains unchanged relative to
our benchmark specification. For the average size regressions on the other hand we
all businesses started in high capital requirement industries are no longer included.
First Stage results can be found at Table 14.
Table 10: Regressions excluding high capital industries




Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes
Observations 70551 27881
Notes: Regressions of changes in entry rate into entrepreneurship
excluding entry into high capital requirement industries,  ERc,g,t
and changes in log of average firm size excluding firms in high cap-
ital requirement industries,  SYc,g,t in economic region c, country
of birth g and year t, on the change in the marriage rate in economic
region c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t. The instrument for
 MRc,g,t is the change in the gender ratio  # 1c,g,t. All specifi-
cations include year dummies to capture national trends, changes
in female labor force among married women, changes in average
income among married men, changes in the share of population at
each triplet (c, g, t) within different age ranges (for 3 different age
ranges), changes in the employment shares of oil and gas sector,
changes in the employment shares of the manufacturing sector and
changes in employment shares of the services sector. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the economic region c and country of birth g
level.
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Table 11 reports results for when we exclude businesses owned by both in cou-
ple. We set entry into entrepreneurship equal to zero (coded as non-entry for the
purpose of these regressions) if both individuals in the couple are listed as owners.
Note that this implies the number of observations for our entry into entrepreneur-
ship regression remains unchanged relative to our benchmark specification. On the
other hand, for the average size regressions, since we exclude all firms owned by
both individuals of the couple, the number of observations is smaller relative to our
benchmark specification. First Stage results can be found at Table 15.
Table 11: Regressions excluding businesses owned by both in
couple




Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes
Observations 70551 27702
Notes: Regressions of changes in entry rate into entrepreneurship
excluding entry into entrepreneurship of firms owned by both in
couple,  ERc,g,t and changes in log of average firm size exclud-
ing firms owned by both in couple,  SYc,g,t in economic region
c, country of birth g and year t, on the change in the marriage rate
in economic region c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t. The
instrument for  MRc,g,t is the change in the gender ratio,  # 1c,g,t.
All specifications include year dummies to capture national trends,
changes in female labor force among married women, changes in
average income among married men, changes in the share of popu-
lation at each triplet (c, g, t) within different age ranges (for 3 dif-
ferent age ranges), changes in the employment shares of oil and
gas sector, changes in the employment shares of the manufactur-
ing sector and changes in employment shares of the services sector.
Standard errors are clustered at the economic region c and country
of birth g level.
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Table 12 reports results for when we exclude businesses for which the spouse
is listed as an employee. We set entry into entrepreneurship equal to zero (coded
as non-entry for the purpose of these regressions) if the spouse is listed as an em-
ployee of the firm. The result is that the number of observations for our entry into
entrepreneurship regression remains unchanged relative to our benchmark specifi-
cation. On the other hand, for the average size regressions since we exclude all
firms for which the spouse is listed as employee of the firm, the number of observa-
tions is smaller relative to our benchmark specification. First Stage results can be
found at Table 16.
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Table 12: Regressions excluding businesses where spouse listed
as employee




Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes
Observations 70551 26945
Notes: Regressions of changes in entry rate into entrepreneurship
excluding entry of firms for which the spouse is listed as an em-
ployee,  ERc,g,t and changes in log of average firm size exclud-
ing firms in which the spouse is listed as an employee,  SYc,g,t in
economic region c, country of birth g and year t, on the change in
the marriage rate in economic region c, country of birth g, year t,
 MRc,g,t. The instrument for  MRc,g,t is the change in the gen-
der ratio,  # 1c,g,t. All specifications include year dummies to cap-
ture national trends, changes in female labor force among married
women, changes in average income among married men, changes
in the share of population at each triplet (c, g, t) within different
age ranges (for 3 different age ranges), changes in the employment
shares of oil and gas sector, changes in the employment shares of
the manufacturing sector and changes in employment shares of the
services sector. Standard errors are clustered at the economic region
c and country of birth g level.
Table 12 reports results for when we consider outcomes for women rather than
men. We construct changes in entry rates  ERc,g,t, changes in log average number
of employees  SYc,g,t and changes in the marriage rate  MRc,g,t for women. Our
instrument in this case is the change in the ratio of number of men relative to women
 # 1c,g,t. First Stage results can be found at Table 17.
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Table 13: Main specifications : Regressions for women




Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes
Observations 65919 25801
Notes: Regressions of changes in entry rate into entrepreneurship
for women,  ERc,g,t and changes in log of average firm size for
women,  SYc,g,t in economic region c, country of birth g and
year t, on the change in the marriage rate in economic region c,
country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t for women. The instru-
ment for  MRc,g,t for women is the number of men relative to
women, # 1c,g,t. All specifications include year dummies to cap-
ture national trends, changes in female labor force among married
women, changes in average income among married men, changes
in the share of population at each triplet (c, g, t) within different
age ranges (for 3 different age ranges), changes in the employment
shares of oil and gas sector, changes in the employment shares of
the manufacturing sector and changes in employment shares of the
services sector. Standard errors are clustered at the economic region
c and country of birth g level.
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Table 14: Regressions excluding high capital industries - 1st Stage




Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes
Observations 70551 27881
Notes: First Stage regression of our endogenous variable (for the en-
try rate regressions), change in the marriage rate in economic region c,
country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t in our instrument, the change in the
gender ratio at economic region c, country of birth g and year t IVc,g,t.
Second Stage are regressions of changes in entry rate into entrepreneur-
ship excluding entry into high capital requirement industries,  ERc,g,t
and changes in log of average firm size excluding firms in high capital
requirement industries,  SYc,g,t in economic region c, country of birth
g and year t, on the change in the marriage rate in economic region c,
country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t. The instrument for  MRc,g,t
is the change in the gender ratio,  # 1c,g,t. All specifications include
year dummies to capture national trends, changes in female labor force
among married women, changes in average income among married men,
changes in the share of population at each triplet (c, g, t) within differ-
ent age ranges (for 3 different age ranges), changes in the employment
shares of oil and gas sector, changes in the employment shares of the
manufacturing sector and changes in employment shares of the services
sector. Standard errors are clustered at the economic region c and coun-
try of birth g level.
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Table 15: Regressions excluding businesses owned by both in couple
- 1st Stage




Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes
Observations 70551 27702
Notes: First Stage regression of our endogenous variable (for the en-
try rate regressions), change in the marriage rate in economic region c,
country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t in our instrument, the change in the
gender ratio at economic region c, country of birth g and year t IVc,g,t.
Second Stage are regressions of changes in entry rate into entrepreneur-
ship excluding entry by firms owned by both in couple,  ERc,g,t and
changes in log of average firm size excluding firms owned by both in
couple,  SYc,g,t in economic region c, country of birth g and year t, on
the change in the marriage rate in economic region c, country of birth
g, year t,  MRc,g,t. The instrument for  MRc,g,t is the change in
the gender ratio,  # 1c,g,t. All specifications include year dummies to
capture national trends, changes in female labor force among married
women, changes in average income among married men, changes in the
share of population at each triplet (c, g, t) within different age ranges
(for 3 different age ranges), changes in the employment shares of oil and
gas sector, changes in the employment shares of the manufacturing sec-
tor and changes in employment shares of the services sector. Standard
errors are clustered at the economic region c and country of birth g level.
60
Table 16: Regressions excluding businesses where spouse listed as em-
ployee - 1st Stage




Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes
Observations 70551 26945
Notes: First Stage regression of our endogenous variable (for the entry rate
regressions), change in the marriage rate in economic region c, country of
birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t in our instrument, the change in the gender ratio
at economic region c, country of birth g and year t IVc,g,t. Second Stage are
regressions of changes in entry rate into entrepreneurship excluding entry by
firms where spouse is listed as an employee,  ERc,g,t and changes in log
of average firm size excluding firms where spouse is listed as an employee,
 SYc,g,t in economic region c, country of birth g and year t, on the change in
the marriage rate in economic region c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t.
The instrument for  MRc,g,t is the change in the gender ratio,  # 1c,g,t. All
specifications include year dummies to capture national trends, changes in fe-
male labor force among married women, changes in average income among
married men, changes in the share of population at each triplet (c, g, t) within
different age ranges (for 3 different age ranges), changes in the employment
shares of oil and gas sector, changes in the employment shares of the man-
ufacturing sector and changes in employment shares of the services sector.
Standard errors are clustered at the economic region c and country of birth g
level.
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Table 17: Main specifications : Regressions for women - 1st Stage
Dependant Variable at 2nd Stage  ERc,g,t  SYc,g,t
 IVc,g,t 0.006 0.009
(0.001) (0.001)
Significance IV for  MRc,t Yes Yes
Observations 65919 25801
Notes: First Stage regression of our endogenous variable (for the en-
try rate regressions), change in the marriage rate in economic region
c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t in our instrument, the change
in the gender ratio at economic region c, country of birth g and year
t IVc,g,t. Second Stage are regressions of changes in entry rate into
entrepreneurship for women,  ERc,g,t and changes in average firm
size for women,  SYc,g,t in economic region c, country of birth g
and year t, on the change in the marriage rate in economic region
c, country of birth g, year t,  MRc,g,t for women. The instrument
for  MRc,g,t for women is the change in number of men relative to
women,  # 1c,g,t. All specifications include year dummies to capture
national trends, changes in female labor force among married women,
changes in average income among married men, changes in the share
of population at each triplet (c, g, t) within different age ranges (for 3
different age ranges), changes in the employment shares of oil and gas
sector, changes in the employment shares of the manufacturing sec-
tor and changes in employment shares of the services sector. Standard
errors are clustered at the economic region c and country of birth g
level.
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